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Colorado Model Office Project
EVALUATION OF COLORADO'S
DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION
INITIATIVE
Jessica Pearson, Ph.D.
Nancy Thoennes, Ph.D.
Esther Ann Griswold, M.A.
Center for Policy Research
1720 Emerson Street
Denver, Colorado 80218
303/837-1555
May 1, 1998
Prepared under a grant from the Federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement (Grant No. 90-FF-0027) to the Colorado Department of Human
Services for the Model Office Project
EVALUATION
OF COLORADO'S
DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION
INITIATIVE
INTRODUCTION
Driver's License Suspension (DLS) in the state of Colorado became a
tool for the State Division of Child Support Enforcement in 1995, when House Bill 95-1093
was signed into law.(1) This intervention allows the state
Child Support Enforcement agency to suspend by administrative process the privilege of a
Colorado driver's license of an obligor, when any of certain legal criteria are met.
Unlike some states that revoke professional, business, trade and occupational licenses for
non-payment of child support, Colorado currently limits the license revocation program to
drivers' licenses.(2) In 1997, the Colorado law was changed
to include suspension of Commercial Drivers' Licenses.
The goal of the DLS initiative is the same as for other
child support initiatives recently enacted by the Colorado legislature: to persuade
delinquent noncustodial parents to begin regular payment of child support. License
revocation programs are "final resort" instruments for child support agencies,
designed to instigate action. At first glance, removing a driver's license from a
delinquent obligor may seem wrong-headed, since license suspension quite possibly closes
off avenues for earning income needed to pay child support. This applies to professional
and business licenses which are subject to suspension, also. Child support officials and
state legislators understand the link between a driver's or professional license, income
and child support payments, but also believe that in some cases, a delinquent obligor
needs an incentive to face his/her financial responsibilities. This is particularly true
when an obligor is not paying the monthly support obligation and child support debt is
building.
The Colorado DLS program is designed to encourage
delinquent obligors to establish contact with the county child support agency and either
pay off the back debt with a lump sum, or enter into an ongoing repayment plan, in order
to retire child support debt and at the same time meet the monthly obligations. Once the
DLS process is set in motion for an obligor, s/he is given several opportunities, each
with a thirty-day time frame and allowances for due process, to stop the progression
toward driver's license suspension.
Does this approach work with recalcitrant obligors? Have
child support workers observed any changes brought about by DLS? According to federal
Child Support officials, license suspension and revocation is proving to be an effective
enforcement mechanism for moving delinquent obligors into compliance. As of January 1997,
forty-three states and jurisdictions had enacted some form of license suspension
legislation to address noncompliance with child support orders. Statistics from the State
of Maine are often cited to document the effectiveness of DLS (although they do not
separate the effects of DLS from other enforcement activities during the same time
period). In a four and one-half year period, Maine collected more than $82,000,000 in
child support from 18,007 delinquent obligors targeted for license revocation. Of the 1070
individuals whose driver's or professional license was revoked during the same time, more
than 600 have come into compliance.(3)
When DLS was initiated in Colorado, legislative analysts
projected the impact on collections to be approximately $3.6 million per year. The
Colorado DLS program is managed by the State Enforcement Unit (SEU), although county child
support agencies have a role in the monthly selection of obligors for DLS action. The
program has been gradually incorporated into the state's computerized system for child
support, known as ACSES (the Automated Child Support Enforcement System). DLS is linked
closely to the Credit Bureau Reporting (CBR) initiative, which eliminates duplication of
the work involved in selecting and notifying obligors. As a follow-up to the actions of
CBR, DLS can take advantage of any recent developments with regard to an obligor's
ledgers.
The Colorado DLS program utilizes a multiple-step process.
The criteria by which an obligor becomes eligible for DLS include non-compliance with a
child support order, child support debt or an arrearage balance of $500 or more accrued
and at least sixty days past due, retroactive support owed, or failure to provide medical
support for a child. Additionally, the obligor must first have been referred to credit
bureau reporting agencies for his/her child support obligation.
The DLS action begins when the obligor is sent a
"Notice of Noncompliance." S/he has a thirty-day deadline for settling his/her
arrearage or debt, or arranging for an administrative review. If there is no response to
this notice, ACSES sends an "Initial Notice of Failure to Comply" to both the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the obligor and the DMV produces an "Order of
Suspension." This notifies the obligor of the impending suspension of his/her
driver's license, and also gives the individual thirty days to arrange a repayment plan
with the county child support agency. As soon as an obligor enters into a repayment
agreement, ACSES sends out a Notice of Compliance, requesting that the DMV reinstate the
license. If an obligor does not abide by the repayment agreement and becomes delinquent,
ACSES issues a "Subsequent Notice of Failure to Comply." This, too, is conveyed
to the DMV and the obligor. The DMV immediately sends out an "Order of
Suspension," which triggers a suspension unless the obligor enters into a repayment
agreement and complies for at least 90 days. Each notice includes an informational section
that lists the total amount in arrears, the enforcing county agency phone numbers, and the
options by which an obligor may address the impending license revocation. Thus, the
process of DLS combines warnings and concrete information with clearly-defined
time-frames.
This report describes the results of an independent
evaluation of the Colorado DLS intervention, conducted by the Center for Policy Research.
It focuses on the effectiveness of the intervention by a) analyzing the types of obligors
who respond or fail to respond to the license suspension intervention, and b) examining
the payment patterns of obligors to whom the suspension notification process was applied.
The report also presents the reactions of state and county child support personnel to DLS,
with regard to workload impact and overall effectiveness.
METHOD
The evaluation of Colorado's DLS program involved establishing three groups of
obligors, drawn from the same pool of 7,200 randomly selected court cases used to evaluate
the Credit Bureau Reporting program (Pearson and Tuschen 1997). Of these cases, 2,704
fulfilled the stricter criteria for the DLS evaluation, and were randomly assigned to one
of three groups: a control group which received neither credit bureau reporting nor
driver's license suspension notifications; a group which received credit bureau treatment
only; and a group which received both credit bureau and driver's license suspension
treatments.
The cases that comprised the three groups were analyzed in terms of these
characteristics: number of children involved, marital status of the obligor, gender and
age of the obligor, and the TANF/non-TANF status of the case. We also reviewed each
obligor in terms of his/her driver's license status, and number and type of citations
received. Following the release of notifications of failure to comply and license
suspension, we analyzed the cases for patterns of response and payment.
The qualitative component of this evaluation involved phone interviews with child
support personnel in seven counties and at the state level in February and March, 1998.
They were questioned about the impact of DLS on collections for the county, and on the
payment patterns of obligors. Respondents were asked also to reflect on how the initiative
has altered the work of the agency. Finally, they were asked to compare the initiative
with other programs, such as Credit Bureau reporting, in terms of effectiveness.
IMPACT OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
REVOCATION
Our evaluation of the impact of possible driver's license revocation on child support
payment began with a sample of 7,200 randomly selected court cases originally generated on
August 15, 1995 for the evaluation of the effects of Credit Bureau reporting.
Of the 7,200 randomly generated child support court cases, approximately 62 percent
were not used in this study because they failed to meet the stricter reporting
requirements of the new intervention. The remaining 41 percent, or 2,704 court cases, were
divided into:
Control group:
1,702 court cases which were qualified to be reported to credit bureaus and to the
Department of Motor Vehicles, but were reported to neither.
Credit Bureau Treatment Only:
436 court cases which were qualified to be reported to credit bureaus and to the
Department of Motor Vehicles, but were reported only to credit bureaus.
Credit Bureau and Driver's License Suspension:
566 court cases which were qualified to be reported to credit bureaus and to the
Department of Motor Vehicles, and were reported to both.
PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE
Our baseline snapshot of all court cases eligible for driver's license suspension was
taken immediately prior to the mailing of notices in the treatment group warning that the
Department of Motor Vehicles would be suspending driver's licenses unless the obligor took
immediate action.
From ACSES we found that about two-thirds of the court cases involved only a single
child, about a quarter involved two children and the remaining 10 percent involved three
or more children. Only four percent of the obligors were female, and the average age of
the obligor was approximately 37 years.
About 60 percent of the court cases that qualified for DLS reporting were in category
three at baseline, indicating that the obligor could not be located. Approximately 24
percent the of the cases involved the collection of arrears for former TANF cases (AF).
Another 17 percent were non-TANF cases (NC), and the remaining 59 percent were primarily
current TANF cases with both current and past due support.
| Table 1 Class and Status of Cases Qualified for DLS Reporting by
Group |
|
Neither Credit Bureau nor DLS |
Both Credit Bureau and DLS |
Credit Bureau Only |
Total |
| Arrears on former TANF |
22% |
24% |
35% |
24% |
| Non-TANF cases |
18% |
15% |
11% |
17% |
| All others |
60% |
60% |
54% |
59% |
From the Department of Motor Vehicles we found that most obligors were in the DMV
system. About two-thirds of the obligors had been issued a regular adult license by the
DMV. About 8 percent had been issued temporary licenses, provisional permits (the license
issued to drivers between 18-21 years of age), or minor's permits. Approximately 6 percent
had been issued commercial licenses. Approximately 20 percent had never been issued a
license, although some of these obligors (8%) were in the DMV system because they had
applied for an adult identification card.
| Table 2 Type of Driver's License Issued
Cases Qualified for DLS Reporting |
| Type of License |
Control Group not reported to credit bureaus or driver's license |
Reported to credit bureaus only |
Reported to credit bureau and
driver's license |
Total |
| Regular adult |
67% |
66% |
67% |
66% |
| Provisional, minor's, temporary |
8% |
5% |
7% |
7% |
| Commercial |
7% |
7% |
5% |
6% |
| Probationary |
1% |
1% |
1% |
1% |
| None, but ID card |
10% |
6% |
10% |
8% |
| No record at DMV |
8% |
16% |
11% |
12% |
Knowing whether an obligor had ever been issued a license, however, did little to
predict who had a valid license when the notification of suspension was sent. As Table 3
indicates, only about 35 percent had a valid license on the eve of reporting to the DMV.
Thirty-eight percent had a license that had been suspended or revoked, and 23 percent did
not have licenses but were eligible to apply.
| Table 3 Current License Statues Among Those Eligible for DLS Reporting |
|
Reported to DMV and credit
bureaus |
Credit Bureau only |
Neither DMV nor credit bureaus |
Total |
| Valid |
35% |
37% |
33% |
35% |
| Valid commercial |
3% |
7% |
|
4% |
| Suspended or revoked |
39% |
32 |
44% |
38% |
| Expired, may apply |
23% |
24% |
23% |
23% |
We also extracted information on the total number of citations received by obligors who
had been issued licenses. About 11 percent of the obligors had never been ticketed.
Overall, each obligor received an average of 10 violations, and the median was 7. Forty
percent had been ticketed most recently in either 1996 and/or 1997.
Approximately 40 percent of the obligors who had been issued licenses had violations,
actions or judgments related to alcohol, 55 percent had violations related to lack of
proper insurance, and 39 percent had been cited for driving without a valid license.
| Table 4 Of Those Qualified for Reporting, Percent Cited for
Various Offenses |
|
Reported to DMV and Credit Bureaus |
Credit Bureau Only |
Neither Credit Bureau nor DMV |
Total |
| Alcohol-related offenses |
39% |
47% |
47% |
43% |
| Improper insurance |
61% |
46% |
53% |
55% |
| Driving without valid license |
42% |
40% |
30% |
39% |
We reported in Table 3 that 38 percent of all obligors who qualified for DLS reporting
had a revoked or suspended license at the time DLS notification went out and 35 percent
had a valid license. But even among many of those with a valid license, their license had
expired. Two-thirds of the obligors eligible for DLS notification (66%) been the subject
of a license revocation or suspension at some time in the past. The two most common
reasons for the revocations were lack of insurance (25%) and alcohol related violations
(23%). Other common reasons included excessive points (17%) or habitual offender status
(16%).
The profile of obligors eligible for suspension from the DMV data would lead us to
expect that notification of driver's license suspension would prompt action by only a
small percentage. Less than half of those notified had a valid non-commercial driver's
license at the time of the DLS reporting, about two-thirds had had a license suspended in
the past, and well over a third had been cited in the past for driving without a valid
license.
OUTCOMES
WHO RESPONDS
A review of ACSES reveals that very few administrative review hearings were held to
deal with the issue of license suspension. Of all cases sent notices of suspension, only
one percent proceeded to a review hearing.
About 17 percent of the cases sent notice of license revocation show evidence that a
repayment plan was developed. A lump sum payment was made in one percent of the cases (See
Table 5).
| Table 5 Responses at Each Post-Notification Time Point |
|
June '97 (after notice about suspension) |
July '97 (Immediately
after notice of non-compliance) |
Oct '97 (6
months after notice of non-compliance) |
February ' 98 (12 months
after notice of
non-compliance) |
| Made lump payment |
1% |
1% |
1% |
1.4% |
| Arranged repayment of MAD |
10% |
10% |
13% |
17% |
When we compare obligors who respond to the notice by developing repayment plans with
those who do not, we find several significant differences. First, as Table 6 indicates,
repayment plans are more likely to be established in non-TANF cases. Twenty-eight percent
of the non-TANF cases with DLS notification result in a repayment plan. In all other class
and status groups only 14-15 percent of the cases with DLS notification develop repayment
plans.
| Table 6 The Influence of Class and Status on the Establishment of
a Repayment Plan
Cases Reported for DLS * |
|
Arrears in Former TANF Case |
Non-TANF Cases |
All Other Class and Status Cases |
Total |
| Established Repayment Plan |
14% |
28% |
15% |
17% |
| *Differences across the groups are statistically
significant at .01 or better |
Second, obligors who develop repayment plans when warned about license suspension have
something to lose. In general they are not better drivers. Compared to those obligors who
do not respond, those who develop repayment plans are just as likely to have significant
numbers of prior violations, alcohol-related violations, and prior suspensions. They are
nearly as likely to have violations for driving without proper insurance or driving
without a valid license (See Table 7).
| Table 7 Comparison of Cases that Develop Repayment Plan and Those
Which Do Not
on Prior Offenses |
|
Do Not Develop Repayment Plan |
Develop Repayment Plan |
| Average prior offenses |
10.7 |
8.9 |
| Alcohol-related offenses |
39% |
40% |
| Driving without insurance |
63% |
51% |
| Driving without valid license |
45% |
31% |
| Prior license revocations |
70% |
63% |
However, those who work out repayment plans are twice as likely as those who do not to
have a valid license at the time they are notified. Although they are not flawless
drivers, and many have learned in the past what it means to have a license revoked, those
who respond have valid licenses and therefore have something to lose by not responding
(See Table 8).
| Table 8 Development of Repayment Plan by License Status at
Notification |
|
Valid License |
Valid Commercial License |
Suspended/Revoked |
No License, May Apply |
| Did not develop repayment plan |
73% |
94% |
93% |
89% |
| Developed repayment plan |
27% |
6% |
7% |
11% |
THE EFFECTS OF LICENSE SUSPENSION ON PAYMENT
To get a better sense of the effects of drivers' license suspension on payment of child
support, we compared payment levels in the seven months prior to the time notification was
sent and the eight months after for cases in our three treatment groups. In all treatment
groups, we find that payment performance improves over time. However, we find
significantly greater increases in payments among those who received drivers' license
suspension notification.
Overall, payments are highest among court cases receiving driver's license suspension
in addition to credit bureau reporting. Table 9 shows average payments per 100 obligors in
each of the three groups. The results suggest that credit bureau reporting alone had very
little impact with this sample of cases. This is not surprising. Had reporting been
sufficient to motivate obligors to pay, these obligors would not have qualified for
license suspension. These obligors had been reported to the credit bureau reporting
agencies on December 3, 1995, about 1½ years before DLS treatment was initiated. On the
other hand, drivers license suspension produces a far greater increase compared to
non-treatment.
| Table 9 Amount of Child Support Collected Per 100 Cases by
Treatment Group* |
|
Neither Credit Bureau nor DLS |
Both Credit Bureau and DLS |
Credit Bureau Only |
| 7 months prior |
$3,306 |
$2,552 |
$4,181 |
| 8 months post |
$4,936** |
$11,469** |
$5,017 |
| Difference pre to post |
$1,630 |
$8,917 |
$836 |
| *Excludes one case with a $180,000 lump sum
payment **Differences pre and post are
statistically significant |
The general pattern of highest collection for those receiving
drivers license suspension in addition to credit bureau reporting continues to hold when
we control for case class and status (see Table 10).
| Table 10 Average
Amount of Child Support Collected Per 100 Cases Prior to and Following DLS Notification By
Class and Status |
|
Neither DLS nor Credit Bureau |
Both DLS and Credit Bureau |
Credit Bureau Only |
| Arrears on Former TANF |
| 7 months prior |
$2,337 |
$2,324 |
$2,452 |
| 8 months post |
$3,663* |
$4,981* |
$3,859* |
| Never on TANF |
| 7 months prior |
$5,838 |
$5,682 |
$8,867 |
| 8 months post |
$9,060* |
$11,351* |
$8,531 |
| All Others |
| 7 months prior |
$2,883 |
$1,846 |
$4,360 |
| 8 months post |
$4,134* |
$14,107* |
$5,064* |
| *Differences pre and post are significant at .05 or better |
ESTIMATING COLLECTIONS STATEWIDE
If the patterns outlined above hold for the state, what additional child support
collections might we expect to see as a result of driver's license suspension? Table 8
shows that collections rose in the eight months following driver's license suspension
notification, even among groups not receiving notification. This is simply
another way of saying that all collections in Colorado are showing a steady climb over
time. To determine which benefits to attribute to a general climb and which to attribute
to driver's license suspension notification, we simply subtract the
gains made by the non-treatment group from the gains made by the DLS group:
| Table 11 Differences in Payments Immediately
Prior to and Following Notification
by Treatment Group |
|
No Treatment |
Driver's License Suspension |
DLS Minus No Treatment |
| Paid 7 months prior |
$3,306 |
$2,552 |
|
| Paid 8 months post |
$4,936 |
$11,469 |
|
| Difference pre to post |
$1,630 |
$8,917 |
$7,287 per
100 cases |
These calculations suggest that every eight months $7,287 additional
child support is collected for each 100 cases with driver's license notification. To date,
Colorado has notified 22,000 obligors and suspended 12,000 licenses. Based on our finding
of $7,287 in savings per 8 months per 100 notices, we project an annual influx of
$2,404,710(4) in child support due to DLS. Although this
falls short of the state goal of $3.6 million per year, it could grow if DLS is extended
to obligor groups that have not yet been included in the notification and suspension
process, namely obligors who only owe past due support.
REACTIONS TO THE DLS INITIATIVE
The overall reaction of county child support administrators to the initiative is very
positive; it was described by several people as "one of the best tools we've had in
years." Some counties have seen a sizeable increase in collections; other counties
are pleased that DLS is generating more interaction with previously delinquent obligors.
Respondents believe DLS to be much more effective than Credit Bureau Reporting, because
for many people the loss of a driver's license will have a broader impact on their life
than will a poor credit rating. One administrator explained that the DLS notification
process reaches people who are not traditional wage earners, and therefore are not paying
child support through wage assignments. Thus, people who are self-employed, or who could
not retain their jobs without a driver's license are responding to the threat of losing
their license: "People are coming out of the woodwork. Men who we would never have
heard from before, are now coming in to set up a repayment plan."
Even though the notification process gives the obligor many opportunities to respond,
in some counties there is a pattern of obligors not contacting the local child support
office until after their license has been suspended. Sometimes the notices are mailed to
an old address, or for other reasons the obligor does not receive his/her mail. These
obligors tend to be angry. One respondent thought that DLS tends to "bring out the
worst in people", particularly those people who have had their license suspended and
are stopped by the police for driving without a license. She described having to call the
guards to restrain a man who was furious about having his license suspended. On the other
hand, since child support workers routinely field irate phone calls, respondents generally
downplayed this effect of the intervention.
The option of allowing obligors to negotiate repayment plans to settle back debt,
instead of requiring payment of lump sums, has several benefits. From the perspective of
the obligor, it allows him/her to move toward a position of good financial standing
gradually. And it has been helpful to county agencies that serve primarily low-income
populations. Thus, some child support agencies focus primarily on developing manageable
repayment plans. According to one county administrator, "Too many men (in this
county) don't have the money to pay off the debt in a lump sum, and it is better to get
some money than no money." But for other counties, lump sum settlements are
encouraged. One county emphasizes, and in most cases requires, lump sum payments for
arrearage. "We tell them to give a lump sum to show good faith", explained the
respondent.
County administrators found the implementation of DLS to be difficult, but manageable.
Only one respondent suggested that the increased workload is far greater than is reflected
by the collections received from this intervention. The state Child Support Unit has been
helpful and responsive when the county technicians have encountered problems with the
program. Most respondents stated that technicians would have benefitted from formal
training, and in many cases workers were unprepared for the heavy impact DLS has had on
their daily work routine. In part, the increased workload in the first year of the program
reflected the fact that it was handled manually. Even though it is now fully automated,
workers must update ledger balances and make manual adjustments to child support accounts.
Additionally, workers have been wary of unknowingly suspending the licenses of obligors
who are in compliance, and have worked hard to avoid making mistakes. Respondents reported
that the overall rate of error has been very low, despite the problems of making the
program operational. One concrete suggestion for minimizing improper notifications is that
the state SEU should release a month ahead of time the names of the obligors whose
licenses will be suspended, giving the county workers the opportunity to review and update
these cases.
In general, respondents felt that the publicity for the initiative was adequate. In one
county, the child support agency reported that advertising the program through posters
placed on public buses garnered a great deal of attention. People interviewed stated that
the most powerful messages regarding DLS are being given by word of mouth, since "the
obligors really talk amongst themselves."
The positive endorsement of the DLS program by county administrators was tempered by
one criticism. The significant problem with this initiative, according to a respondent who
works at the county level, is that there are no exceptions built into the program. She
noted there are obligors whose monthly income is limited to social security or disability
benefits, and who should be exempted from losing their driver's license.
This is the finding of state CSE administrators, also, who view the intervention as
being too harsh in certain circumstances. They point out that the goal of the DLS program
is to persuade noncustodial parents to make regular payments of child support, or to pay
back child support debt. Ideally, the suspension of an obligor's driver's license should
serve as a productive threat. Despite the program being designed to lead obligors into
payment action, 12,000 obligors have had their Colorado driver's licenses suspended in the
past eighteen months. Although SEU personnel expected some suspensions with the initiation
of the program, the reports they are receiving indicate there are complications built into
the automated system that can work against obligors genuinely trying to comply. For
example,
obligors may be making payments regularly, but their cases have been flagged in ACSES
as delinquent because of late payments. Such flagging is in line with the rules for Credit
Bureau Reporting, but sets in motion a process of license suspension that can cause havoc
for an obligor who is mostly in compliance.
According to one state CSE administrator, the program needs to be refined. Committees
are at work now developing a new set of business rules for CBR and DLS, in order to
accommodate how the two programs can address and utilize the payment histories of
obligors. Meanwhile, CSE technicians scrutinize with caution selected cases for DLS
treatment, to prevent the inappropriate initiation of the process against obligors who are
in compliance.
CONCLUSIONS
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 requires
that states establish the authority to revoke drivers', professional, occupational and
recreational licenses as a child support compliance remedy (PRWORA §369). Of the
forty-three states and jurisdictions with license suspension legislation in early 1997,
thirty-three programs were administratively-based or used a combination of administrative
and judicial processes. Like other initiatives created to incorporate mass case
processing, license revocation programs require that a variety of state agencies cooperate
and develop compatible automated data-base systems.
The Colorado DLS intervention is popular with county child support administrators; it
is perceived to be a useful tool in many cases. Although there were problems incorporating
the program into the work load of county technicians during the first year, administrators
believe their staffs have adjusted to the changes. County agencies find DLS to be
successful because in some instances the notification process results in the arrangement
of repayment plans or lump sum payments of arrears. State administrators, however, are
mindful of the hardships that license suspension can impose, and believe the program needs
to be modified to allow for various contingencies.
This analysis of Colorado's DLS program segregates the effects of this intervention
from other enforcement activities initiated by the child support agency during the same
period of time. We compare comparable, random samples of obligors exposed to DLS and
credit bureau reporting, credit bureau reporting only, and neither intervention. The
analysis shows that over an 8 month period of time, DLS generates an extra $7,287 for
every 100 cases with a notification of imminent suspension. In the 18 months since DLS was
initiated on a state-wide basis, 22,000 obligors have been sent such notices. This
translates into an estimated $2,404,710 per year in child support collections that would
not have otherwise been paid.
The analysis of randomly selected delinquent obligors who were notified of impending
license suspension indicates that as an incentive, DLS works for people who have a valid
license, and presumably would be disadvantaged without it. For a certain percentage of
delinquent obligors, however, the threat of DLS does not appear to be an effective tool to
prompt child support payments. As the research detailed above indicates, obligors in
approximately 17 percent of the cases in the sample which were subjected to DLS treatment,
arranged a repayment plan following notification of impending license suspension. The
profile of the 1,702 cases sampled for this study uncovered surprising patterns of lapsed,
revoked, or suspended licenses, and significant numbers of violations related to alcohol
and lack of proper insurance. Of the obligors who had ever held a license, less than half
had a valid driver's license at the time DLS notification was initiated.
A study on uninsured motorists conducted in Oregon in 1986 uncovered similar patterns
(Jones 1986). The state of Oregon has a mandatory insurance requirement, with additional
financial responsibility requirements that apply to drivers falling within a high risk
group for driving uninsured. A comparison of insured and uninsured motorists found that
drivers in the uninsured group tended to be younger, were more likely to have had
a criminal record, were prone to have poor credit ratings, and tended to have more prior
traffic convictions and accidents than did insured motorists.
Together, the Oregon statistical profile and the Colorado DLS evaluation suggest a
definable group of individuals that could be characterized as "standing outside the
law" in terms of adhering to state laws and meeting financial obligations. This group
does not include all obligors, of course. The sample used for the Colorado DLS research
was composed of obligors who had already qualified for Credit Bureau Reporting, and thus
were in arrears on monthly payments for more than sixty days. It represents only
delinquent obligors meeting strict criteria for purposes of analysis. But the collective
profile uncovered by the research reveals there is a portion of obligors that will not be
responsive to DLS, because suspension of a license carries little impact for them.
The Driver's License Suspension initiative will not solve all of the problems created
by delinquent obligors. But it appears to be a tool that can enhance other agency
remedies. It is particularly effective in non-TANF cases. Finally, it may also be
effective in cases involving obligors who only owe past due support, a group not currently
included in the process. Should Colorado move to expand the license suspension program to
include professional and occupational licenses, the profile of delinquent obligors
eligible for this remedy would look much different. It makes sense to expect significant
increases in repayment arrangements and lump sum settlements when the obligor has much
more to lose than a lapsed or revoked driver's license.
REFERENCES
Jones, Barnie. 1986. A Profile of Uninsured Drivers in Oregon. Motor Vehicles Division,
Oregon Department of Transportation.
Pearson, Jessica and Kay Tuschen. 1997. Evaluation of Colorado's Credit Bureau
Reporting Initiative. Denver, CO: Center for Policy Research.
1. Colorado Revised Statutes,
Sections 26-13-123; 42-2-127.5; and Volume 6, Sections 6.101.2 and 6.803.1.
2. For a brief description of each state's
license restriction program, see "State Licensing Restrictions &
Revocations", printed in 1997 and distributed by OCSE, Department of Health and Human
Services.
3. State of Maine, Department of Human Services, Division of Support
Enforcement and Recovery. 1998. Highlights of License Revocation Initiative.
4. 22,000 notices ÷ 100 = 220;220 x $7,287 =
$1,603,140 in 8 months; $2,404,710 in 12 months. |